Justice Rilwan Aikawa of the Federal High Court sitting in Ikoyi, Lagos on Thursday, June 28, 2018 adjourned to October 2, 2018 for ruling on a motion filed by Muhammed Dele Belgore, SAN, seeking an order of the court to expunge the charge brought against him by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC.

Belgore is standing trial alongside a former Minister of National Planning, Prof. Abubakar Sulaiman, for allegedly receiving the sum of N450m on March 27, 2015 out of the $115,010,000 paid by a former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Diezani Alison-Madueke, to influence the outcome of the 2015 presidential election. 

 

They were accused of handling the huge sum without going through any financial institution, contrary to the provisions of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act.

 

At the last adjourned sitting on June 25, 2018, the prosecution counsel, Rotimi Oyedepo, argued that the application filed by Belgore urging the court to reject the Certificate of Identification in Exhibit 3 on the grounds that it was altered was an attempt to stall the proceedings.

 

Oyedepo further urged the court to put in abeyance the hearing and determination of the motion, which he said was intended to suspense the court’s order calling on the defence to open its case in accordance with the provisions of Section 396 of the ACJA.

 

However, at today’s sitting, counsel to the first defendant, E.O. Sofunde ,SAN, while responding to the motion dated May 21, 2018, stated that “My submission is in two folds: the prosecution counsel’s submissions are predicated on Section 396(1) (2) (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, ACJA. However, I need to start by showing the court the application on which the hearing was brought.

 

“The application was brought on the inherent ruling of the court and not under any provision of the ACJA. The significance of inherent jurisdiction is that it is preserved by Section 6(6a) of the Constitution.

 

“If at all there is any conflict between the powers exercised by inherent jurisdiction and the ACJA, the inherent jurisdiction preserved by the Constitution must prevail. In this case, the inherent power sought is to stop an abuse of process.

 

“There is no doubt that the court has the power to stop an abuse of process.”

 

Sofunde also stated that the defence was not challenging the validity of the charge by the application; hence, it could not come within the premise of Section 396.

 

“Even if we are to consider the provisions of Section 396, it talks about an application challenging the validity of a charge.

 

Sofunde, who defined abuse of process as something so unfair and unreal that would not allow the prosecution to contend with what is in respect to the proceedings, added that the application was an attack on something that had happened on a document, thereby questioning the fairness of the charge.

 

“I will concede that matters having to deal with merit can be considered at the time of judgment. However, this application has nothing to do with the merit of the case.

 

“Even if the court were to hold that Section 396 of the ACJA applies to the application, the purpose of the provision is not to deter a defendant from filing his application at any stage of the proceedings.  It is not also to deter him from moving his application at any stage of the proceedings. Rather, it only circumcises the time on which the court should give a ruling on when the application shall be moved.

 

 

“I urge the court to overrule the prosecution’s objection.”

 

In his response, Oyedepo addressed the issues of inherent power of the court, saying that “the inherent power of the court is conceded as a wild power. It has its limitation within the ambit of the proceedings that regulates the procedures.

 

“In order words, the general inherent power of the court will not be applicable, where there is a statutory provision.

 

“This proceedings is constitutionally guided and regulated by the ACJA. Therefore, the court is bound to rely and evoke the statutory provision, where the general inherent power of the court is involved.”

 

Rotimi also added that there is no conflict between Section 6 of the Constitution and the provisions of the ACJA that regulate the provisions as earlier argued by the SAN, adding that it merely complements the ACJA.

 

“Where a statute provides a mode of doing a particular act, that act must be done in line with that procedure. The mode provided by the ACJA is that, upon the plea of the defendant, trial must commence day- to- day and at the close of the prosecution, the defendant can enter the no-case submission or proceed with his or her defence. At the end of the case, the court will either discharge and acquit the defendant or do otherwise.

 

“I concede that the court has the power to prevent abuse of process.  That power is only accessible when the alleging party establishes that there is an existence of an abuse.  In view of the fact and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that there is any abuse.

 

“Asides the provision of Section 396, the court has the power and discretion that cannot be faulted to determine this application at the time of delivering judgment.”

 

He finally submitted that “Section 396 is not seeking to restrict or curtail the right of the defendant; but it allows the defendant to bring any objection and also allows the court to determine the objection at the point of delivering judgment. The right to fair hearing cannot be said to be curtailed, if the proceedings is conducted in line with the statutes.”

 

He urged the court to disagree with Sofunde by upholding his submissions and consider the application along with the defence in their final addresses.

 

Also, Sofunde informed the court of a motion dated June 14, 2018 seeking the release of his client’s passport to enable him to attend his daughter’s graduation on July 4, 2018 in the United Kingdom and also attend to his health sometime in August, 2018.

 

The application was supported by a seven-paragraph affidavit and a written address.

 

Counsel to the second defendant, Olaniran Obele, also prayed the court for the release of his clients passport to enable him to perform Hajj between August 12 and 26, 2018.

 

Oyedepo did not oppose the prayers of the defence.

 

He, however, asked the court to include additional securities to ensure that the defendants return their passports, adding that “It is their only bond with the court.”

 

In a short ruling, Justice Aikawa granted the prayers of the defendants and directed that they provide sureties and  a sum of N2million (Two Million Naira) for the purpose of the trip only to guarantee the return of their passports.

 

The sureties must be resident in Lagos and must have reasonable sources of income.

 

The matter was adjourned to October 2, 2018 for ruling on the application and possible continuation of hearing.

 

                                                                                Media & Publicity
                                                                                 28 June, 2018