A new twist was on March 16, 2017 brought to the N1.162 billion fraud trial of Joshua Dariye, a former Plateau State governor, as his counsel, G.S. Pwul, SAN, told a Federal Capital Territory, FCT High Court, Gudu, that he intends to withdraw from the case.
The application by Pwul comes on a day that Justice Adebukola Banjoko had fixed "for defence to continue". The trial judge had at the last sitting on March 6, 2017 acceded to the request of the defence to recall first prosecution witness Musa Sunday, an EFCC operative "for further cross-examination".
The re-examination of Sunday, who was present in court, could not however, proceed as Pwul brought a fresh application seeking to "disengage" himself from representing Dariye.
"After painstakingly going through the status of the case, I have come to the position my lord, to withdraw further appearance in court for the defendant," Pwul said.
He further informed the court that: "There has been two appeals against my lord's last ruling and subject to instruction of my client I will still appear there ".
In objecting the application, Rotimi Jacobs, SAN, argued that there were legal procedures required to be complied with before a counsel whether on side of defence or prosecution can disengage from representing a client.
Making reference to Section 349 (7) (8) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, ACJA 2015, which deals with “non-appearance and non-representation of legal practitioner”, Jacobs noted that a counsel had a greater responsibility to the court not only to the client.
He said: “A legal practitioner, other than a law officer, engaged in any matter shall be bound to conduct the case on behalf of the prosecution or defendant until final judgment, unless allowed for any special reason.
“Where a legal practitioner intends to disengage from a matter, he shall notify the court, not less than three days before the date fixed for hearing and such notice shall be served on the court and all partiers.”
Having exhaustively quoted from the Act, Jacobs urged the court to “dismiss the application as incompetent”, arguing that Pwul did not follow the procedure laid down by law, and “his intention was to put the court in a state of helplessness”.
However, Pwul argued that three lawyers had represented Dariye before him, since 2007 when the trial initially started, and that the 1999 Constitution (which he said superseded the ACJA) has enshrined in Section 36 (6) “the right of the defendant to choose who will represent him in court”.
He further argued that if there was a party delaying the trial, it was the prosecution. Pwul noted that “anytime we make an application, the prosecution always objects and this amounts to nothing but finger-pointing to cover up their own actions of delay”.
He said: “I have taken the path of courtesy and respect to tell the court that I want to withdraw from this case, else I would have just left unceremoniously by way of absence in court, and so I believe this courtesy and my path of honour should be commended.
“Moreover, it will serve no useful purpose to compel an unwilling counsel to defend criminal charges against his will, as skills and commitment are involved and no amount of court order can cause these attributes to come out of an unwilling counsel.”
Responding, Jacobs noted that Pwul in his arguments did not indicate that he was withdrawing based on the instruction of Dariye, and “the law must be upheld, since he is still enjoying the confidence of his client”, adding that the three other lawyers referred to by Pwul represented the defendant at a time the ACJA was not yet in existence.
At this point, Pwul again rose up to respond and waxing philosophical, said: “We shouldn’t force a horse to the stream when we cannot force the horse to drink water.”
Justice Banjoko then asked: “Who is the horse?”
“I am the horse,” Pwul responded.
Justice Banjoko adjourned to March 20, 2017 to rule on the application.
Media & Publicity
16th March, 2017